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Abstract 
The attempt to recover the international origins of social and political thought is 
motivated by the unsatisfactory fragmentation of modern knowledge - by its failure to 
account for the intimate connections between theory and history in general and its 
international dimension in particular - and seeks to overcome these divides. This 
article provides an analysis of the theory/history divide and its role for the 
fragmentation of modern knowledge. Theoretically, it shows, this divide is rooted in, 
and reproduced by, the epistemic foundations of modern knowledge. Historically, the 
modern episteme arises from a crisis of imperial politics in the 18th century. This 
analysis suggests that theory, history, and the international are products rather than 
origins of modern social and political thought. These historical origins thus do not 
provide the basis for more integrated forms of knowledge. They do, however, reveal 
that and how the fragmentation of knowledge itself simultaneously serves and 
obscures the imperialist dimension of modern politics.   
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Introduction 
The project of recovering the international origins of social and political thought is 
motivated by the glaring disjuncture between the everyday experience of intimate 
connections between theory and history, domestic and international politics on the 
one hand and their separation in scientific knowlege production on the other. Bridging 
these gaps thus promises 'better' knowledge: theories that are rooted in and sensitive 
to the historical context; histories conscious of their theoretical assumptions; 'theory-
practice as a single field'; and international relations as an integral dimension of 
theory and history (Barkawi and Lawson, 2016). Such knowledge, in turn, is expected 
to provide the basis for 'better' political practice. A return of universal history, for 
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example, is expected to generate 'a sense of human solidarity or global citizenship' 
(Christian, 2010, pp. 25-6, 7-8, 19).   
 
Yet, fragmentation does not just affect the relations between history, theory, and the 
international. It has long been identified as a problem of the modern sciences in 
general and social and political thought in particular - leading to almost ubiquitous 
demands for interdisciplinarity and inspiring the development of new fields, or 
approaches, like historical sociology, political economy, biochemistry, or universal 
history that aim to bridge the gap between neighbouring fields or even between the 
humanities and the natural sciences at large (Christian, 2010, p. 24). Such projects are 
often successful in institutionalizing new fields of study, but they do not satisfactorily 
resolve the problem of fragmentation. Despite its rich contributions to our 
understanding of the modern world, historical sociology, for example, failed to 
convince mainstream sociology of the need for a historical approach; is criticized by 
historians for not meeting the methodological requirements of history; is itself 
internally fragmented; and has a history of excluding relevant dimensions of social 
and political life - such as culture or race (Adams, Clemens and Orloff, 2005, pp. 10-
1, 25-7, 30, 32). This fate is by no means specific to historical sociology but rather 
characteristic of attempts to cross disciplinary divides - and it thus calls for a general 
analysis of the dynamics of fragmentation in the modern sciences. This article 
provides such an analysis, focusing on the example of History and International 
Relations (IR).
2
 
 
I will begin by analyzing previous attempts to bridge the gap between history and 
(international) theory - which fall into two broad strategies. The first seeks to build on 
common features of these disciplines. It tends to fail because it overlooks that the 
separation is embodied in their very constitution. Consequently, the second strategy 
seeks to reconceptualize history and/or theory but fails to take into account the 
necessary historical context.   
 
Responding to these lacunae, the second section provides a theoretical account of the 
constitution of modern disciplines in general, and History and IR in particular. 
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Following Foucault's archeological approach, I argue that the fragmentation of 
knowledge has its roots in the modern episteme. Reconstructing the nature and 
dynamics of the modern episteme explains why systematic attempts to overcome 
disciplinary divisions simply tend to reproduce fragmentation. 
 
The third section locates the historical origins of this modern episteme in the 'age of 
revolutions'. It shows that politics at the time was characterized by empires - and that 
the modern episteme and its distinction between theory and history, domestic and 
international politics, is a response to, rather than the root of, a political crisis of 
empire. On the one hand, therefore, historical analysis cannot lead back to a time 
when the international and domestic, historical and theoretical, dimensions of politics 
were integrated - and could therefore provide the basis for less fragmented forms of 
knowledge today. On the other hand, this historical analysis draws attention to the fact 
that epistemic and disciplinary fragmentation provided a 'solution' to the crisis of 
imperial politics. It thus highlights that the distinction between theory and history, 
domestic and international politics today serves the continuation of imperialist power 
politics precisely by obscuring them.  
 
In conclusion, this article suggests that bridging the gap between history and 
(international) theory is bound to fail: theoretically, because each of these fields is 
constituted through the separation from the other, and historically because their 
origins lie in imperial rather than international politics - a distinction I will discuss in 
depth in section three. However, the analysis of these theoretical dynamics and 
historical origins of the fragmentation of modern knowledge does reveal its 
performative role in making the reproduction of imperialist policies possible. If not 
overcoming the fragmentation of modern knowledge as such, therefore, this analysis 
nevertheless opens up particular functions of this fragmentation to critique. 
 
Bridging the gap between History and IR 
The fragmentation of modern knowledge is seen as a problem both in History and in 
International Relations. Historians and IR scholars have thus explored the possibilities 
of bridging the gap between the two disciplines. Broadly two different strategies, I 
will show, characterize these efforts - but both tend to fail. Analyzing these strategies, 
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I will argue that both miss a crucial dimension - theoretical in one case and historical 
in the other - of the root of the problem. 
 
In many ways, History and IR are inextricably linked (Walker, 1989; Jenkins, 1991, 
p. 5; Smith, 1999, pp. 8, 1; Isacoff, 2002, p. 603). History and the social sciences, 
including IR, emerged from a common discourse in the 19th century (Sewell, 2005, p. 
2). Early IR scholars were often trained as historians and/or approached the 
problematique of international politics through historical investigations. Despite 
particularly behaviorist challenges, historical approaches were never entirely replaced 
in IR. And since the end of the Cold War, there has been renewed interest in historical 
approaches and even the suggestion of a 'historical turn' in the discipline (Vaughan-
Williams, 2005, p. 116; Teschke, 2003, pp. 1-2; Bell, 2001; Hobden, 2002, p. 56; 
Lawson, 2012).  
 
Furthermore, IR cannot escape history in the sense of 'the past' or 'past events'. Its 
subject matter, international politics, consists itself of historical events and the data 
used to substantiate even the most ahistorical and abstract IR theory are 'historical 
facts'. Conversely, historians regularly use social science concepts, categories, 
metaphors and theories - not only explicitly, as in the case of the Annales school, but 
as a matter of course (Sewell, 2005, pp. 1-2, 5; Wright, 2008, p. 114; Revel, 2008, pp. 
397-8).  
 
Despite this intimate connection, however, the constitution of separate academic 
disciplines 'utterly transformed the Edenic intellectual landscape' (Sewell, 2005, p. 2). 
While the differences between these disciplines are not absolute or exclusive (Smith, 
1999, p. 9), they are real enough and widely recognized: historians aim to explain 
particular events (the idiographic approach) while IR scholars (and other social 
scientists) search for general laws (the nomothetic approach); historians adopt a 
chronological concept of causation while ahistorical concepts of causation dominate 
in IR; historians focus on agency while IR scholars are interested in structure and 
unintended consequences; historians highlight the moral choices of particular actors 
while IR scholars are interested in the nature of things; and historians tend to integrate 
their theoretical assumptions into historical narratives while IR scholars separate 
theoretical and empirical material (Sewell, 2005, pp. 3, 6, 9, 10; Smith, 1999, pp. 23-
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5; Elman and Elman, 2001, pp. 12-23, 25-27; Lawson, 2012, p. 204; Christian, 2010, 
p. 20; Steinmetz, 2008, pp. 536-7).  
 
These distinctions are widely seen as affecting the quality of work in both disciplines. 
Thus, while historians borrow theoretical concepts form social scientists and even 
change or develop these concepts further in light of their historical expertise, they 
rarely engage in theoretical debates (Sewell, 2005, pp. 4-5). This entails the danger, 
first, of leaving theoretical assumptions embedded in the concepts imported from 
other disciplines unexamined (Revel, 2008, pp. 398, 402, 403). Second, historians are 
likely to overlook structures and processes beyond particular historical cases 
(Lawson, 2012, p. 205; Lebow, 2001, p. 112). The absence of theoretical debate, 
third, means that historians often fail to feed their own theoretical insights back to 
social scientists (Sewell, 2005, p. 5).  
 
IR scholars, meanwhile, tend to treat the output of historians as a trove of facts and 
data, of empirical material that provides building blocks for the construction of 
theories or evidence substantiating them (Smith, 1999, p. 1; Elman and Elman, 2001, 
p. 36). Hence, they overlook that historical material is itself only the highly contested 
product of the narratives that individual historians have created around 'traces of the 
past' usually in response to particular problems in the present and against similar 
narratives developed by other historians (Jenkins, 1991; Lawson, 2012, p. 205). In 
other words, by treating 'ambiguous historical evidence unambiguously' (Smith, 1999, 
p. 11) IR theories based on such material resemble castles built on sand.  
 
In short, while history and theory are always co-implicated, either time or structure 
tends to be hegemonic (Walker, 1989, p. 168) and this imbalance undermines the 
quality of their respective output. Scholars on both sides of the divide thus argue that 
'a deeper theoretical engagement ... could be mutually enlightening', that structure and 
historical conceptions of temporality need to be combined, that each discipline would 
better be able to achieve its own goals if it learned from the other (Sewell, 2005, pp. 
1, 15; Levy, 2001, p. 82; Puchala, 2003; Steinmetz, 2008, p. 549).  
 
In pursuit of this goal, two main approaches can be identified. The first consists in 
building on common interests, assumptions and methods. This narrows the potential 
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for cooperation down to IR scholars with qualitative, interpretive, or case study 
approaches (since the core assumptions of mainstream social scientists are 
incompatible with those of historians) and traditional historians interested in 
diplomatic or military affairs (Elman and Elman, 2001, p. 1; Sewell, 2005, p. 13). 
Establishing cooperation on such shared grounds, moreover, implies that the  
differences of method, sensibility and aesthetics between History and IR (or social 
science more generally) are in fact of 'secondary' importance while common 
assumptions, methods or concerns provide 'shared ground' (Lawson, 2012, p. 221). 
Such commonalities include attention to context - both textual and socio-political - 
and hence also a limitation of the truth claims of either discipline (Lawson, 2012, p. 
216). Both historians and case studies researchers in IR use 'process tracing' which is 
based on the assumption that events always have a synchronic and diachronic 
dimension and thus  'historical events enable social formations to emerge, reproduce, 
transform and, potentially, break down' (Lawson, 2012, p. 217; Bennett and George, 
2001, pp. 137, 145). Further, narrative emplotment is used as a method of establishing 
order, meaning and explanation in history and the social sciences (Lawson, 2012, p. 
219). Finally, the use of ideal types or typological theory - simplified maps of 
historical reality - is found in both disciplines and promises a sensitivity to historical 
particularity and complexity as well as a commitment to systematic inquiry (Lawson, 
2012, p. 220; Bennett and George, 2001, pp. 138, 157). One strategy of addressing the 
gap between theory and history thus lies in building on such shared assumptions and 
practices. 
 
And yet, scholars in both disciplines have long adopted such common strategies 
without producing a body of work that successfully transcends the division. Even 
projects that explicitly aim to bridge the gap by building on such common practices 
ultimately fail (Elman and Elman, 2001, p. 1). While historians, for example, use 
process tracing in order to explain particular cases, IR scholars tend to use it to 
develop and test generalizable theories (Bennett and George, 2001, p. 145). This 
suggests that the separation between history and theory is not 'secondary' but 
fundamental. Hence, scholars argue that the separation itself is fruitful, indeed 
constitutive, of their disciplines. It is 'essential for our work that historians remain 
experts on particular historical eras, events, or regions' because only then will there be 
'historical case studies to draw upon and historical experts to critique our work' 
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(Bennett and George, 2001, pp. 165-6). In other words, the very possibility of IR 
scholarship depends upon the existence of historical expertise and vice versa. 
Identifying common ground is ultimately a tool for 'tacking' more effectively between 
the separate disciplines of IR and History (Lawson, 2012, p. 206) rather than for 
merging them. The fate of these projects suggests, then, that shared assumptions, 
methods, and concerns do not constitute common ground but similar means to achieve 
separate ends - and these separate ends are embodied in the very constitution of IR 
and History respectively. 
 
This insight provides the starting point for the second strategy of dealing with the 
divide between History and IR by reconceptualizing the fields themselves. Given that 
historians themselves have begun to fundamentally question the meaning of 'history' 
(Vaughan-Williams, 2005, p. 117), that 'history cannot escape its own process' and 
will 'therefore always be rewritten' (Isacoff, 2002, p. 608), that there is 'no 
international "history", only "histories"' (Reus-Smit, 2008, p. 401), IR scholars set out 
to develop alternative conceptions of history. Following Derrida, Vaughan-Williams 
argues that instead of importing history, IR should import the problem of history - 
thus making 'the undecidable infinity of possible truths' its object of analysis (2005, 
pp. 134, 136, 129). Inspired by Dewey, Isacoff conceives history as an 
intersubjectively shared or settled understanding of the world that offers the 
opportunity for acting within it (Isacoff, 2002, pp. 608, 616).  
 
Essentially, these approaches accept the 'problem of history' as constitutive - and thus 
turn it into a theoretical issue, into a question of adjudication between competing truth 
claims. While the Derridean approach accepts their undecidability, for the Deweyan 
approach 'democratic processes' or the 'consensus of community' are decisive (Isacoff, 
2002, pp. 605, 620), and constructivists follow Skinner in lowering the criteria for 
truth claims from infallibility to plausibility (Reus-Smit, 2008, p. 405). Yet, such 
'theories' themselves continue to rely on 'historical' claims and narratives which, in the 
absence of independent criteria, gain a 'solidity' that contradicts claims of more or less 
radical contingency (Smith, 1999, p. 171; Isacoff, 2002, p. 619). Moreover, toning 
down the truth claims of historical narratives fundamentally affects their role in the 
construction of theory - and thus requires a redefinition of theory itself (see also 
Lawson, 2012, p. 216). Hence, Smith calls for a more supple and less monolithic 
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conception of theory in accordance with its ancient Greek meaning of contemplation 
and speculation outside of fixed forms of thought (Smith, 1999, pp. 183-4).  
 
These attempts to reconceptualize history show, first, that history and theory are 
indeed constituted in relation to each other. Redefining one of these concepts 
necessarily impacts on the definition of the other. Second, attempts at redefining 
history and/or theory have themselves a long history. Debates about the nature and 
meaning of history are part and parcel of the discipline's development just as debates 
on what constitutes theory are an integral part of the history of other disciplines like 
IR. Yet while such debates are productive of a variety of conceptions of history and/or 
theory and do inspire fruitful work, none of these alternatives has generated a body of 
work that satisfactorily addresses the 'problem of history'. The dynamic of 
disciplinary divisions produces 'an illusion of progress from a reality of tradition': 
Marx, Freud, Weber, Durkheim and others 'erected a vision of the social world that 
has not changed in any foundational sense since their time' (Abbott, 2001, pp. 147, 
152, 26-7). This suggests that conceptions of history and theory are themselves 
historically grounded and require a particular historical context to flourish. It 
highlights that 'once upon a time' the struggle between time and structure did not exist 
(Walker, 1989, pp. 168, 169).   
 
The analysis of these attempts to address the gap between theory and history, in sum, 
shows that neither strategy satisfactorily conceptualizes the space in which the 
separation occurs. This space, as the attempt to build on commonalities shows, needs 
to be located outside the individual disciplines. And its logic, as projects of 
reconceptualization show, must be relational. Finally, this analysis suggest that the 
space of separation is itself historical. What is missing from these strategies to 
overcome the history/theory divide, in short, is its theorization and its historicization. 
 
Theorizing the history/theory divide 
Projects to overcome disciplinary divides tend to reproduce fragmentation. In oder to 
explain this contradictory dynamic, this section provides a theoretical account of the  
fragmentation of modern knowledge in general and the divide between history and 
(international) theory in particular. To this end, I will follow Foucault's archeological 
approach because it addresses the three requirements identified above: it identifies a 
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common epistemic ground for different fields of knowledge, analyses its logical 
dynamic, and locates it within a historical context.
3
 The modern episteme, I will 
show, generates the fragmentary dynamics of modern knowledge in general and the 
history/theory divide in particular.   
 
Foucault argues that all substantive knowledge rests on a deeper layer, the episteme, 
which describes a particular way of 'ordering things', a 'structure of thought', that is 
'common to all branches of knowledge' and that 'men in a particular period cannot 
escape' (1972, p. 191; 1970, p. xxi). This assumption explicitly addresses the three 
dimensions found wanting in existing strategies to bridge the gap between history and 
theory: the common foundations of different disciplines, their relational logic, and 
historical specificity.   
  
Foucault describes three concrete epistemes: the first underpinned Renaissance 
knowledge in the 16th century (Foucault, 1970, pp. 30-34); the second, the classical 
episteme or 'science of order', reigned from the 17th century and Locke to the 
Englightenment and the Idèologues (Foucault, 1970, pp. 71, 329, 346); and the third 
emerges at the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century and constitutes 
the modern sciences (Foucault, 1970, pp. 346, 220-1).
4
    
 
In order to highlight the implications of the shift to the modern episteme, I will begin 
with a brief description of its predecessor - the classical episteme. Under the classical 
episteme, knowledge was produced by positing an abstract philosophical principle - 
often in the form of the state of nature
5
 - which was then used to mechanically link 
different elements together into a composite whole, leading to a rational account of 
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creation and its laws (Foucault, 1970, p. 346). In light of the fact that reality often 
deviated considerably from such rational orders, Enlightenment histories were 
designed to provide an historical explanation for these deviations and advocated a 
return to the proper laws (for a concrete example, see Jahn, 2013, pp. 41-53). This 
classical way of 'ordering things', however, gave way to the modern episteme at the 
turn of the 19th century. Instead of deriving a composite whole from universal 
philosophical principles, the modern episteme endowes individual phenomena with 
their own internal nature. Now, knowledge is concerned with 'the interior time of an 
organic structure which grows in accordance with its own necessity and develops in 
accordance with autochthonous laws' (Foucault, 1970, pp. 226, 265). Yet, by 
endowing individual phenomena with their own internal nature, the modern episteme 
severs the relations between these elements - they are not any longer part of the same 
space, subject to the same pressures, operating according to the same laws - and thus 
constitutes 'new sciences and techniques with unprecedented objects' (Foucault, 1970, 
pp. 253, 226; Ross, 2008, p. 205). Where classical histories had been concerned with 
establishing the relations between different phenomena leading to universal laws 
governing humanity, the modern discipline of History explores the internal 
development of individual actors (Woolf, 2011, p. 362). 
 
The extent of this rupture is debated amongst historians. While some authors argue 
that 19th century historians were united by their antipathy to and rejection of 
Enlightenment rationalism (White, 1973, pp. 38-9), others hold that modern 
conceptions of history 'flowed directly from' and built on Enlightenment work (Reill, 
1975, p. 220). Yet, Foucault's distinction between the epistemic and the substantive 
levels of knowledge was developed precisely to explain the simultaneity of rupture 
and continuity. Hence, 19th century historians were deeply invested in history as 'the 
key to unlock the meaning of life' and as a 'necessary prologue to meaningful reform' 
(Reill, 1975, p. 214; see also Iggers, 1986). But they also held that 'the concept of 
progress and its accompanying optimism has not yet been provided with adequate 
cognitive justification' (White, 1973, p. 47). Modern historians, in other words, 
pursued the same goals as their Enlightenment predecessors - but in radically different 
ways. And these, I will show now, embody and reflect the dynamics of the modern 
episteme. 
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Modern historians departed from the universal time governing individual phenomena 
in Enlightenment histories. Instead, they located time within individual phenomena. 
Thus, Herder, for example, held that every nation followed its own organic historical 
development (White, 1973, pp. 67, 75). Modern history thus moved away from grand 
theories and speculative world histories, from histories of and for humanity as a 
whole, and focused on agency and the (heroic) individual, whether in the form of 
state, society, or culture (Woolf, 2011, pp. 352-4; White, 1973, p. 62; Christian, 2010, 
pp. 12-3; Smail, 2011, pp. 21-2; Armitage, 2013, p. 17). 
 
This reorientation had profound implications for the treatment of historical evidence. 
For Enlightenment historians only evidence in line with their philosophical principles 
was valid and they rejected much - especially local, particular, imaginative - evidence 
as representing unreason, ignorance, prejudice, superstition. In contrast, such 
particular evidence was valuable for modern historians exploring the internal 
processes of particular entities and they believed that by directly looking at empirical 
evidence they could work out its inner meaning (White, 1973, pp. 51, 52, 64; Woolf, 
2011, p. 394). This attitude towards the careful gathering and critical evaluation of 
empirical evidence - systematically developed by Leopold von Ranke - became one of 
the core characteristics of modern historiography. Modern histories thus build bigger 
pictures from the ground up instead of from philosophical principles down (Woolf, 
2011, pp. 352-3, 370-1).  
 
Moreover, history that conceives of individual actors - nations, states, cultures, 
individuals - as developing in accordance with their own internal nature does not view 
any present either as 'demented coinage of a nobler age' or as 'incomplete anticipation 
of an age yet to come' (White, 1973, p. 78). While Enlightenment history sat in 
judgement over people, modern history is characterized by 'empathy' and plays a 
socializing role (White, 1973, p. 38; Woolf, 2011, p. 394). Hence, the 19th century 
historical narratives of the nation were used in schools and in the training of civil 
servants - playing an important role for national integration (Wright, 2008, p. 123; 
Woolf, 2011, p. 346; Christian, 2010, p. 14). 
 
Despite substantive continuities, therefore, the shift from the classical to the modern 
episteme gave rise to a new - empirical, particular, organicist, empathetic instead of 
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speculative, universalist, rationalist, mechanistic and didactic - conception of history. 
More importantly, however, the epistemic logic underpinning this conception of 
history accounts for the fragmentation of modern knowledge in general and the 
theory/history divide in particular. By establishing the internal organic time of 
singularities, the modern episteme fractured the conception of universal time (White, 
1973, pp. 39, 78-9) and with it the essential unity of history and knowledge. This does 
not imply that tensions between history and theory were not already present in 
Enlightenment thought. As mentioned above, Enlightenment authors struggled with 
the disjuncture between their universal 'theories' and historical particularity. The 
argument is, rather, that the modern episteme responded to this tension by providing 
the foundations for a radically different conception of theory and history - for a 
conception of knowledge that builds bridges between fundamentally different 
phenomena rather than positing universal axioms that deny these differences (Abbott, 
2001, p. 5).  
  
First, it led to the substantive fragmentation of the modern discipline of History. By 
endowing individual phenomena with their own internal time, universal history 
dissolved into a myriad of histories - with every individual phenomenon requiring its 
own historical investigation: diplomatic history, political history, institutional history, 
ecclasiastical history, intellectual history, military history, economic history, legal 
history, administrative history, art history, colonial history, social history, agricultural 
history and so on (Revel, 2008, p. 402; Smith, 1999, p. 185; White, 1973, p. 39). This 
process of fragmentation, moreover, develops dynamically. Narrating the history of a 
particular nation as the result of its internal development, for example, ignores the 
role of its external relations which then calls for a new field of study - such as 
diplomatic history. The modern episteme is thus the source of the problem of 'tunnel 
history', of a continuous tunnel linking the present to the past in a particular field but 
'sealed off from contact with or contamination by anything that was going on in any 
of the other tunnels' (Hexter cited in Smith, 1999, p. 185; Löwith, 1949, p. 19).
6
  
 
Second, the dissolution of universal time leads to theoretical and methodological 
fragmentation. When the overarching religious or cosmological context disappears, 
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 The equivalent in theory are 'theoretical silos' (Buzan and Lawson, 2016). 
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individual historical facts suddenly become meaningless - and thus require the 
creation of meaning (Löwith, 1949, p. 10). Hence, the middle of the 19th century was 
characterized by sustained attempts on the part of historians like Michelet, Ranke, 
Tocqueville, and Burckhardt to systematically develop and apply historical theory. 
These attempts, however, culminated in a number of 'equally comprehensible and 
plausible, yet apparently mutually exclusive, conceptions of the same sets of events' 
and thus led to the crisis of historicism at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 
20th century (White, 1973, pp. 41, 432; Wright, 2008) - that is, to the recognition that 
the theoretical ground for choosing an interpretative strategy was lacking. The 
discipline of History thus developed theoretical and methodological divisions - 
between romantic, idealist, positivist history, history as science and history as literary 
masterpiece - already in the 19th century (Woolf, 2011, pp. 377-8; White, 1973, p. 
39). This theoretical fragmentation continues to haunt the discipline of History ever 
since and underpins the frequently recurring debates amongst historians (Vaughan-
Williams, 2005, pp. 133-4; see also Smail, 2011, p. 35). 
 
Third, this dissolution of Theory into theories and the integration of the latter into 
particular historical narratives constitutes the modern separation of history and theory 
in general - and its institutionalization in the fragmentation of the modern sciences. 
Having abandoned the concept of universal time, historians were unable to fulfill their 
desire to pull the disparate histories together. They provided historical material, 
individual 'historical facts', that could only be drawn together and made sense of by 
the application of theory - that is, by abstracting from their concrete and particular 
individual nature and linking them, across time and space, to similar entities. It was 
thus no accident that the grand theories of the time tended to be produced by non-
historians like Hegel, Comte, Marx (Woolf, 2011, pp. 354, 379). History, in other 
words, developed into a master discipline that provided historical material, 'historical 
facts', to other disciplines and fields of knowledge from literary fiction, the collection 
and display of nature, to comparative philology, sociology, economics, anthropology, 
IR and, in turn, borrowed theoretical concepts from them (Revel, 2008, pp. 403, 397-
8; Woolf, 2011, p. 378). These other disciplines, meanwhile, filled the gap that 
History had left behind: they set out to link the disparate 'historical facts' - they 
supplied theory. 
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The development, and fragmentation, of the modern sciences at large follows 
precisely this logic. The modern, or internal, conceptualization of economy, for 
example, excluded its political dimension which led to the development of a 
discipline of Political Science whose internal definition, in turn, led to the emergence 
of International Relations addressing external political relations (Morgan, 2008; 
Schabas, 2008; Bannister, 2008; Farr, 2008; Long and Schmidt, 2005). And each of 
these sciences, disciplines, and fields of study is itself - just like the discipline of 
History - subject to dynamic fragmentation and hence internally divided in terms of 
issue areas, methods and theoretical approaches (Jahn 2016). The most fundamental 
of these divides within the modern sciences at large - that between the natural and 
social sciences - was in fact triggered by historians in the 19th century who argued 
that nature and history were driven by entirely different internal logics and their 
analysis hence required fundamentally different tools (Wright, 2008, pp. 117, 119). 
And it is this division between history and the natural sciences that attempts to revive 
universal history today aim to overcome (Christian, 2010, p. 24). 
 
The modern episteme thus provides the common ground for the modern sciences in 
general and for History and International Relations in particular. Key to 
understanding the failure of attempts to overcome this history/theory division, 
however, is the fact that the modern episteme constitutes them in relation to each 
other. The modern understanding of theory as explaining the dynamics of interaction 
between different phenomena - states, markets, social groups, cultures, genders, 
individuals - presupposes the prior establishment of these entities as particular units 
with their own internal nature and history. The very possibility of IR and its pursuit of 
nomothetic theories, in other words, is dependent on the ideographic conception of 
history which produces the gaps that nomothetic theories must fill (Woolf, 2011, p. 
387). This is why even scholars interested in closer cooperation between History and 
IR ultimately come to the conclusion that the separation between these disciplines is 
'essential' (Bennett and George, 2001, pp. 165-6). Neither the modern conception of 
history nor that of (international) theory could exist without their separation.  
 
More generally, it is the recognition that modern knowledge is always only 'partial' 
knowledge (Foucault, 1970, p. 373) that leads to the almost ubiquitous pursuit of 
interdisciplinarity. Yet, because modern knowledge cannot help but establish the 
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internal coherence of such new fields, interdisciplinarity ironically contributes to the 
dynamic reproduction of fragmentation (Ross, 2008, pp. 227, 235; Foucault, 1970, pp. 
357-8; Abbott, 2001, p. 147). It manages to overcome existing boundaries only by 
erecting new ones around the internal coherence of newly integrated fields. This 
theorization of the history/theory divide thus explains not only the failure of bridge-
building attempts; it also explains why such projects themselves become a source of 
fragmentation.   
 
Historicizing the history/theory divide 
The failure of alternative conceptions of these fields to gain historical traction, 
meanwhile, requires a historicization of this divide. The modern episteme and hence 
modern social and political thought, I will suggest, arises in response to a crisis of 
imperial rather than international politics. Epistemic foundations of knowledge are 
therefore historically constituted and cannot be changed at will. The imperial nature 
of their historical origins nevertheless highlights the 'imperialist' function of the 
modern notion of international relations - and lays it open to critique.  
 
Foucault himself was not interested in exploring the link between the historical 
context and the emergence of the modern episteme but focused instead on the analysis 
of the type of knowledge to which it gave rise. Nevertheless, he held that particular 
historical events may provide 'a determined set of circumstances' or 'precise questions' 
that shape the development of knowledge (1970, p. 345). He also located the 
emergence of the modern episteme at the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 
19th century and went so far as to provide exact dates for the outer limits of this 
process: 1775-1825 (1970, pp. 221; 233-4).
7
 In line with other scholars, he thus 
placed the emergence of the modern episteme squarely in 'the age of revolution' 
(Löwith, 1949, pp. 193-4; Wright, 2008, p. 113; Hobsbawm, 1962, pp. 336-58; 
Armitage, 2013, p. 37).  
 
The age of revolution was conventionally associated with the American, French, 
Industrial and (much more rarely) Haitian Revolutions. These revolutions were 
                                                 
7
 See Michon (2002) for a general discussion of time in Foucault's work.  
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interpreted as the result of domestic developments in (mostly) European or Western 
societies that gave birth to the modern nation state and modern conceptions of politics 
which subsequently spread across the globe (Palmer, 1959; Hobsbawm, 1962). This 
narrative is now highly contested and debates range from the 'chronological definition 
of the Age of Revolutions' through its causes and consequences, to its meaning and 
scope (Armitage and Subrahmanyam, 2010, p. xviii). The conventional conception is 
accused of being 'strikingly Eurotropic, if not quite Eurocentric' (Armitage and 
Subrahmanyam, 2010, p. xxx; Hunt, 2010) and revisions highlight global rather than 
domestic causes, the continuity of empire rather than the establishment of nation 
states (see Mulich, 2016a, in this volume), the diversity of influences and comparative 
developments in the non-European world (Armitage and Subrahmanyam, 2010, pp. 
xix, xxxi-xxxii). Though following this revisionist literature, I will nevertheless focus 
on European actors since this is the geographical context in which the modern 
sciences were institutionalized.    
 
At a first glance it appears as if international politics played a crucial role for the 
development of modern social and political thought. There is widespread agreement 
now that the 18th century saw the first 'world wars' and was more generally 
charaterized by a 'world crisis' or 'world conflict' (Armitage and Subrahmanyam, 
2010, pp. xiv, xxiii; Bayly, 1989, pp. 164, 95; 2010, p. 216). These 'world' crises and 
wars, I want to suggest however, cannot be equated with 'international' politics. The 
polities that populated Europe during the 18th century (and many other parts of the 
world as well) were empires and the nature of imperial politics defies the modern 
distinction between domestic and international politics. Hence, scholars regularly 
apply terms like 'global', 'cosmopolitan', 'transboundary' (Armitage, 2013, pp. 33-45), 
'transnational' (Bayly, 2010, p. 216) to the politics of that time.   
 
Empires can be defined as large and expansionist political units that incorporate, 
'usually coercively', a variety of different populations and govern these groups 
differently (Burbank and Cooper, 2010, p. 8; Go, 2011, pp. 6-7). Consequently, 
empires are 'politically fragmented, legally differentiated, and encased in irregular, 
porous, and sometimes undefined borders' with 'areas of partial or shared sovereignty 
within larger spheres of influence or rule' (Benton, 2010, p. 2). Modern nation states, 
in contrast, are based 'on the idea of a single people in a single territory constituting 
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itself as a unique political community' (Burbank and Cooper, 2010, p. 8). Politics in 
an imperial age is thus characterized by internal diversity, fuzzy borders, and fluid 
and expansive policies while politics in the age of nation states is characterized by 
internal homogeneity (ideally, if not in practice), external diversity, and a clear 
inside/outside distinction (Walker, 1993). The latter gives rise to two different types 
of politics - domestic and international - neither of which, I will argue first, did exist 
during the 18th century.   
 
From the 16th to the 18th century, European powers extended their rule dramatically 
across space - to America, Africa and Asia, as well as over territories and populations 
within Europe. During the 18th century, hence, all the major actors in Europe were 
empires. These empires included enclave trading colonies, plantation colonies, 
settlement colonies in addition to older conquests within Europe. The British Empire, 
for example, entailed Scotland, Ireland, Wales, settler colonies in North America, 
plantation colonies in the Caribbean, trading posts in India. These entities were home 
to a wide variety of people and peoples: indigenous peoples, slaves, English-speaking 
creoles, trading corporations, land speculators, peasant farmers, virtually self-
governing settlers, local elites (Bayly, 1989, p. 76). Each of these groups, moreover, 
was subjected to a different type of rule. While the Scottish elite was represented in 
parliament, the Irish was not (Bayly, 1989, p. 88); while the English were taxed 
highly and subject to close control by the government, the settlers in the American 
colonies paid very little taxes and enjoyed considerable political autonomy 
(McFarlane, 1994, p. 254); while slaves in the sugar islands had no rights, their white 
masters made their voices heard in Parliament (Bayly, 1989, p. 80); and while the 
North American colonies were ruled by governors, the East India Company relied on 
indigenous rulers (Burbank and Cooper, 2010, pp. 242-3). Indeed, delegated legal 
authority - carried by 'ship captains, leaders of reconnaissance voyages, trading 
companies, municipalities, colonial governors or viceroys, and garrison commanders' 
- and the resulting 'layered sovereignties' were a defining feature of empire (Benton, 
2010, p. 31).  
 
This diverse internal make-up of empires made anything resembling domestic politics 
impossible. While British common law was restricted to England, the legal authority 
of the King and English subjecthood were projected to other areas of the empire. 
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Similarly, the Spaniards limited ecclesiastical authority and developed new 
institutions for (American) Indian subjects. Generally, 'anomalous legal zones were so 
common that they came to be regarded as integral and expected elements of empire' 
(Benton, 2010, pp. 29-30). Conversely, the principle of 'occupation' that is now 
regarded as a major feature of international law was not employed in the context of 
equal relations between sovereign states but between dominant and dependent parts of 
the globe (Fitzmaurice, 2014, p. 16).  
 
The diverse internal make-up of empires also implied fuzzy borders. When, after the 
Seven Years War, Britain took over the French colonies in North America, for 
example, it guaranteed the laws, customs, legal systems and religious life of the 
Quebecois. This fed the suspicions of the original British settlers that the Western 
lands were to be settled with Catholics and ruled despotically (McFarlane, 1994, pp. 
253, 259). Moreover, having lost their French allies, indigenous tribes were suddenly 
confronted with the expansionist interests of British settlers. In order to reduce 
friction, Britain established the Proclamation Line that was supposed to keep these 
groups apart. Maintaining such a boundary, however, proved impossible. The line was 
'difficult to locate and impossible to police' (Benton, 2010, p. 14); both parties lived 
on both sides of the line and it fed the resentment of the settlers against the 
government (McFarlane, 1994, pp. 253-4). In other cases, relatively clearly defined 
boundaries did not prevent local actors from cooperating with each other. In the 
Leeward Islands white planters from islands belonging to different empires 
established security cooperation across borders in the face of slave revolts (Mulich, 
2016b; Benton, 2010, p. 37). And in yet other cases control in border regions 
constantly shifted from one power to the other (Benton, 2010, p. 37). Such fluid 
boundaries made it difficult to determine what was inside and what outside.  
 
Moreover, these examples show that the expansionist policies of empires were driven 
by a variety of actors like trading companies, planters, settlers and governments 
(Burbank and Cooper, 2010, p. 170; Benton, 2010, p. 3), by private agents seeking 
'wealth, virtue or religious redemption' (Darwin, 2009, p. 3) and not by a clearly 
defined foreign policy of the metropole. The different interests within these empires 
created powerful pressures for expansion and hence for geopolitical competition 
within and outside Europe (Bayly, 1989, p. 95). Already at the beginning of the 18th 
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century, Britain participated in the War of the Spanish Succession (1702-13) partly 
because a rising influence of France in the Americas would have threatened the 
strategic security of its North American colonies (McFarlane, 1994, p. 220). With the 
boundaries between British and French colonies in North America unsettled, the need 
to protect British settlers from impending French expansion also led to the 
participation of Britain in the Seven Years War (1756-1763). White planters on the 
sugar islands were completely dependent on imperial protection in the face of 
potential slave revolts, Spanish and French competition, and for the supply of basic 
necessities that were not produced in plantation economies (McFarlane, 1994, p. 261; 
Bayly, 1989, pp. 91-2). Irish dairy and pastoral products were excluded from the 
English market in order to protect English farmers and hence particularly dependent 
on export to the colonies (Bayly, 1989, p. 87). Similarly, poor Scots emigrated in 
large numbers to the overseas colonies, joined the East India Company, and the 
military that fought the Seven Years War and the War of American Independence 
(Bayly, 1989, p. 86). Conversely, the collapse of the South Sea Company produced a 
serious political crisis in London and thus ensured that the government subsequently 
guaranteed, however grudgingly, British interests abroad (Bayly, 1989, p. 80).  
 
The fact that these empires were made up of a ragtag of different populations, forms 
of rule, and fuzzy borders thus led not only to expansionist pressures, it also turned 
interimperial rivalries into 'world wars' fought out in all corners of the globe. Already 
the War of the Spanish Succession at the beginning of the 18th century was fought not 
just in Europe but also in North and South America. Theaters of the Seven Years War 
- by some accounts 'rightly seen as the first truly transnational war in history' (Bayly, 
2010, p. 216) - could be found in Europe, North America, Central America, West 
Africa, India, and the Philippines (Burbank and Cooper, 2010, p. 220). Even the War 
of American Independence was not just fought between the settlers and the British 
government but included Spain and France. And yet, these wars were not 
'international' in the sense of pitching clearly defined domestic or national interests 
represented by imperial governments against each other. They were driven, instead, 
by a conglomerate of reasons ranging from dynastic competition through private 
economic interests to local conflicts and intraimperial tensions. 
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The cost of these 'world wars', however, played a crucial role in bringing about the 
upheavals of the age of revolutions. Not only, as Kant noted, did imperial policies 
furnish soldiers for wars in Europe but their financing through debt seriously harmed 
the population (1957, p. 23, 6). Generally, imperial governments tried to cover the 
cost of these wars by increasing taxation - and this led to widespread resistance 
(Fitzmaurice, 2014, p. 5; Bayly, 2004, p. 86; Darwin, 2009, p. 18). France's attempt to 
raise additional revenue ultimately led to the Franco-Haitian Revolution (Skocpol and 
Kestnbaum, 1990, p. 17; Burbank and Cooper, 2010, p. 220; McFarlane, 1994, p. 
302). Britain's repeated attempts to raise taxes in its North American colonies and in 
India resulted eventually in North American independence (Burbank and Cooper, 
2010, p. 220). Spain tightened control over its colonies and thus upset intermediaries 
and triggered resistance (Burbank and Cooper, 2010, p. 247). While the outcome of 
these tensions and struggles differed from case to case (Burbank and Cooper, 2010, 
pp. 247, 225, 227; McFarlane, 1994, pp. 258, 274; Blaufarb, 2007, p. 761), they were 
consistently triggered by the increase of taxes and central control in order to cover the 
cost of war. 
 
The crisis that culminated in the age of revolutions at the end of the 18th century thus 
had its roots in the nature and weaknesses of imperial politics rather than in 
international or domestic politics. 'National' identity or 'democratic' aspirations were 
not the source of the crisis but rather its product. There was no clearly articulated 
American nationalism in the British colonies before 1765 and it was only in the 
context of resistance against the British that poorer men began to join the committees 
and transformed American political life (McFarlane, 1994, pp. 274, 272, 258). 
Similarly, in France the Jacobin clubs initially mobilized the propertied and educated 
elites and only later, in the context of war, began to serve as recruitment agencies for 
national administrative and military efforts and hence wider participation (Skocpol 
and Kestnbaum, 1990, pp. 19-20). And the slaves of St Domingue, too, were initially 
not fighting for 'national' independence but rather for freedom within the empire 
(Burbank and Cooper, 2010, p. 227).  
 
The outcome of these political struggles was therefore not the constitution of nation 
states. Instead, it was an uneasy and volatile mixture between new political ideas 
revolving around freedom and old imperial politics. On the one hand, the age of 
 21 
revolution gave rise to new forms of thinking about politics, new forms of 'claim-
making', new conceptions of the role of the state and the nature of international order, 
new ideas about popular rights (Bayly, 2010, pp. 212-3; Bayly, 1989, p.100) and led 
to the fragmentation of empires - particularly in the Americas (Armitage, 2013, pp. 
215-6). On the other hand, they generally resulted in a continuation of imperial 
politics albeit in different constellations. Spain managed to strengthen its control over 
the American colonies between 1783 and 1796 (McFarlane, 1994, p. 302). The result 
of the French Revolution was the crowning of Napoleon as emperor and his pursuit of 
empire building both within and, less successfully, outside Europe. Citizenship rights, 
moreover, were ultimately neither extended equally to the population of St Domingue 
nor to the various populations conquered in Europe (McFarlane, 1994, pp. 274, 272). 
American independence led to an 'empire of liberty' that included slavery and 
rightless indigenous populations (McFarlane, 1994, p. 281). Upon independence from 
Portugal, Brazil set itself up as an empire in its own right continuing differential 
political rule (Burbank and Cooper, 2010, pp. 220-1). Threatened by the military and 
ideological challenge of the French Revolution and fearful of social upheaval, Britain 
entered a new phase of imperial expansion (McFarlane, 1994, p. 306). The crisis of 
empire and fear of domestic revolt led creole elites to line up behind the government 
(Bayly, 1989, p. 99). Despite the loss of the North American colonies, Britain gained 
new territories in the Caribbean, strengthened its hold over Canada and hardened its 
control of India (McFarlane, 1994, p. 285). Indeed, the principle of layered 
sovereignty so characteristic of empire was confirmed by the Berlin Conference as 
late as the end of the 19th century (Fitzmaurice, 2014, pp. 28, 7). 19th century 
politics, in sum, was characterized by the contradictory political principles of  
freedom and imperialism (Benton, 2010, p. 4; Mulich, 2016a) and the idea of an 
international order based on nation states was only codified in 1948 in the UN 
Charter, and largely realized in the 1970s after decolonization (Burbank and Cooper, 
2010, p. 183; Armitage, 2013, p. 21). 
 
It was to this tension between freedom and empire and its fragmentary potential that 
the modern episteme provided a 'solution'. As the second part of the 18th century 
unfolded, schism and severance, conflict and suffering increased and widened the gap 
between the universalist structure of thought and the lived experience of people 
(White, 1973, p. 62). The modern episteme naturalized this fragmentation by 
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providing different people and peoples with their own internal nature and individual - 
national - histories. 'Herder's acceptance of every totality as inherently possessing its 
own rule of articulation could be extended to a contemporary society, as well as to 
past social orders, in a spirit acceptable to both the Conservative and Liberal ranges of 
the sprectrum of political ideology' (White, 1973, p. 78; see also Bayly, 2010, p. 212). 
Consequently, tensions between these groups did not appear any longer as the result 
of a disfunctional political order but as rooted in their diverse natures and 
developmental differentials. The national histories of the 19th century thus played a 
crucial role in ameliorating the social and political tensions of the revolutionary era; 
and they were indeed used - in education and the training of civil servants (Wright, 
2008, p. 123; Woolf, 2011, p. 346; Christian, 2010, p. 14) - as guiding principles for 
the establishment of national unity in the crisis ridden and fragmented societies 
emerging from the age of revolution.  
 
This invention of the modern concept of the nation as a political community with its 
own internal nature and independent history, moreover, simultaneously implied the 
existence of an international sphere in which these independent nations interacted 
with each other. The concept of sovereignty developed by 19th century lawyers 
encapsulated and codified precisely this freedom and independence of individual 
nations from others and provided the basis for the modern conception of international 
relations as the interaction of free and formally equal 'like units'. Hence, it was no 
accident that the term 'international' was first used by Bentham in the 1780s with 
reference to the legal relations between independent communities (Armitage, 2013, 
pp. 42, 70). 
 
These concepts completely obscured, however, that historically these sovereign 
nation-states-in-the-making had not developed independently from each other but 
were constituted by and through the messy and hierarchical relations within and 
between empires of which most of them were still a part. And it was precisely by 
hiding these constitutive relations between individual communities that the modern 
episteme facilitated the continuation of empire. It allowed 19th century international 
lawyers, political theorists, and practicioners to present the right to freedom - 
sovereignty - as a natural property of the internal characteristics of a nation. By the 
same token, however, the denial of sovereignty to other communities was not 
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depicted as the result of power politics but rather as the natural consequence of 
(lacking) internal - cultural, religious, racial, or political - achievements. As John 
Stuart Mill famously argued, barbarians had no rights as a nation (Mill, 1984, p. 119). 
19th century international law is, in fact, characterized by the (ultimately 
unsuccessful) attempt to elaborate objective criteria for the recognition or denial of 
sovereignty rights based on the internal characteristics of particular communities 
(Anghie, 2007). The modern episteme thus allowed political actors to endorse the 
universal principle of freedom even while they engaged in imperialist power politics. 
 
Similarly, the 19th century imperialism of free trade, combining freedom and 
oppression, was made possible by this internalist conception of politics and 
economics and their separation. Imperialism of free trade entails the use of economic 
means to establish, maintain, and expand political inequality and informal empire 
within the international system (Gallagher and Robinson, 1953). Yet, such practices 
were not considered 'imperialism' because they simply followed the generally valid 
internal logic of economics - free trade; just as the resultant hierarchies were not 
'imperialism' because they did not entail formal political rule of the dominant over the 
dependent community. In contrast to the 18th century empires in which politics and 
economics were intimately linked and the metropole was forced to deal with the 
political consequences of its economic policies (such as revolutions as a result of 
increasing taxes), the empire of free trade could distance itself from the political fall-
out of its economic policies (such as the destruction of indigenous industries) and 
leave this responsibility to formally independent indigenous governments. It thus 
facilitated the continuation of imperialism not just ideologically but materially.  
 
Finally, as Robert Vitalis has recently shown (2015), even the establishment of the 
discipline of International Relations in the United States was driven to a considerable 
extent by the desire to defend, maintain, and expand the dominance of the white over 
other races (see also Bell, 2014). Yet, these roots of the discipline have remained 
hidden for almost a century behind the modern conception of international relations as 
relations between sovereign states - and hence divorced from anxieties about race that 
crossed the domestic/international divide and concerned 'natural' properties of 
different groups rather than 'relations' between them. 
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The modern episteme, in sum, structures thought by providing individual phenomena 
with an independent nature and thus separating them from others. This structure 
underpins the modern political concepts - nation, international, sovereignty, politics, 
economics etc. - that came to play a crucial role in facilitating the continuation of 
imperialism during the 19th century. It provides three crucial political functions: it 
naturalizes and thus depoliticizes fragmentation - including social and political 
tensions; it provides the guiding principles for internal integration - including national 
integration; and it hides the constitutive role of relations between different entities and 
thus accommodates contradictory principles - including those of the domestic and 
international, economics and politics, power and freedom, sovereignty and 
imperialism.  
 
Conclusion 
This Special Issue explores the possibilities of bridging the gap between theory, 
history and the international with a view to producing better integrated and hence also 
politically more useful knowledge. Since previous attempts to address the 
fragmentation of modern knowledge have remained unsuccessful, this paper has taken 
a step back from these bridging projects and provided a theorization and 
historicization of the fragmentation of modern knowledge in general and the 
history/theory divide in particular.  
 
It shows that this fragmentation has its roots in the modern episteme that endowes 
individual phenomena with their own internal nature and thus severs their relations to 
each other. This structure underlying modern thought constitutes particular historical 
'facts' that then require 'theories' to link them with each other and provide them with 
meaning. Overcoming these fragmentary dynamics would thus require new epistemic 
foundations of knowledge. Yet, epistemic change, I have argued, is triggered by 
specific historical circumstances - in this case a 'crisis of empire' (McFarlane, 1994, p. 
252) in the 18th century. New conceptions of history or theory thus fail to gain 
traction, I suggest, because they lack the requisite historical foundations that could 
sustain them.  
 
Yet, tracing the origins of modern social and political thought does not just identify 
the historical nature of epistemic change. In addition, it challenges a widely shared 
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assumption that also motivates this particular project: the idea that identifying the 
historical nature of particular institutions allows us to change them, that anything that 
is the result of human practices can be unmade - purposely destroyed, altered, 
neglected, forgotten or radically reconstructed - by human practices (Sewell, 2005, p. 
10; see also White, 1973, p. 434).  
 
The modern episteme that underpins the fragmentation of modern knowledge 
certainly is the result of human practices - specifically, I have argued, of the crisis of 
empire in the 18th century. Yet, while recovering this history shows that things could 
have been different and thus allows us to discover our agency, it 'does not provide us 
with a warrant to engage in fantasies of omnipotence' (Kratochwil, 2006, p. 8). The 
crisis was the result of the conjunctural and unintended consequences of a myriad of 
individual events and practices spread across the entire globe. It was a general crisis 
giving rise to a general structure of knowledge beyond the reach of any particular 
purposeful human agency. Indeed, the very conception of politics that holds that 
human beings 'can, in principle, master all things by calculation' (Weber, 1948, p. 
139) is itself the product of the modern episteme, of the fragmentation of knowledge 
into a myriad of 'things'. 
 
More constructively, the search for the roots of modern social and political thought 
draws attention to the fact that its architecture 'is inherently disposed towards empire 
or inherently disposed towards Western interests and values'; it unveils the 'liberal 
myth ... that the instruments of political thought are objective or neutral standards' 
(Fitzmaurice, 2014, pp. 11-2). It shows that modern social and political thought 
provided a 'solution' to the 18th century crisis of empire by accommodating both 
freedom and imperialism. And it draws attention to the fact that the very same 
function still operates today. Just as in the 19th century, the denial of sovereignty 
rights through sanctions and interventions is depicted as the natural result of the 
internal shortcomings of particular societies: their failure to protect human rights, 
their lack of good government; and free trade policies are imposed on weaker 
economies with reference to the nature of economics. Missing from these accounts are 
the power relations between the different parties. And it is these power relations 
embedded in and hidden by modern social and political thought that the search for its 
international origins brings to light and lays open to critique. 
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